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due to rigid adherence to independence, a broad platform, and rejection of 
fusion. 
Part of the problem is a stylistic choice to let the insurgents "speak for 
themselves." The approach minimizes distortion of their collective message. It 
becomes somewhat of a liability when analyzing the dynamics of party com- 
petition. Explanations for the G.L.P.'s failure are drawn almost solely from its 
adherents, and focus on mudslinging and bulldozing. Lause argues "context" 
over "partisanship," yet his own narrative indicates the latter was important. In 
a footnote, he relates that cultural regimentation also arrested the turn to social- 
ism. If he means it supplemented political oppression, which appears the case, 
then perhaps partisanship was important after all. Cultural regimentation also 
featured socialization into party subcultures. Maybe entrenched partisanship 
was a major obstacle for the G.L.P. In the South, for example, he attributes 
Democratic hostility to racism. While this factor was important, partisanship is 
also pertinent to explaining Democratic antagonism towards threats to its 
powerbase. Indeed, ritualistic behavior displayed at the unity convention indi- 
cates even the G.L.P. was not entirely free from the trappings of broader tradi- 
tional partisan cultures. 
Lause is rightly skeptical of pronouncements by victors, and his study is a 
valuable corrective to earlier treatments which overemphasized fusionist ten- 
dencies. Yet, the thesis is overdrawn, and thereby skews the third party profile 
towards radicalism, albeit an influential faction within the G.L.P., but not nec- 
essarily its defining element. Despite its national aspirations and desire to 
realign the electoral system, the G.L.P. achieved neither objective, nor is its 
demise necessarily traceable only to overt political repression. Indeed, its rise 
and fall may actually have contributed to spawning more fusionist-oriented par- 
ties in the future that sought to avoid its fate. A disjuncture may have occurred 
in 1880, but there may be more to the case for continuity than Lause concedes. 
Tom L. Franzmann 
Stillwater, Oklahoma 
Kenneth Warren, Big Steel: The First Century of the United States Steel 
Corporation, 1901 -2001 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 200 1). 
Kenneth Warren has written what will probably be seen as the definitive histo- 
ry of US Steel, or at least of its first 100 years. This is a book that is compre- 
hensive, detailed and, despite being heavily based on documents from US Steel 
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itself, critical. In addition, although focusing on US Steel, his story is placed 
within the larger context of the development of the American steel industry as 
a whole, so it will also prove to be a critical source on the industry's develop- 
ment in the United States as well. 
The book is a straight-forward rendition of the corporation's history. While 
it does not focus on each plant or each product line, it is focused around 
"themes of technological and locational change, major shifts in corporate pol- 
icy, and reaction to new patterns of demand or government pressure of all 
kinds" (xvii-xviii). Professor Warren was allowed access to corporate docu- 
ments, and had over 12 hours of interviews with top corporate officers, some 
in office and some retired. He has tried to understand why the corporation took 
a particular developmental path at different times, and not only accounts for 
these changes but critically evaluates them as well. 
The contradiction that Warren focuses upon is the one between potential 
and reality: when formed, US Steel was the largest industrial corporation in the 
world, and "this exceptional size was expected to confer exceptional commer- 
cial advantages" (I). Yet, this never worked out: the humongous size of the cor- 
poration never provided these advantages - at least not until a radically 
slimmed down version of the corporation emerged in the 1990s - and, in fact, 
usually worked against the corporation. US Steel basically was an amalgama- 
tion of different steel companies, each which had been developed to meet its 
respective needs, and until the late 1980s - late in its eighth decade! - was 
never rationalized to meet a strategic plan that directed the development of the 
new corporation. As such, it took a "supermarket" approach to steel production, 
trying to provide steel from one "source" to meet each and every need. This was 
an approach that might have worked had the corporation focused its efforts 
from the beginning on technological and organizational innovation, but its very 
size made it a continuing target of public and government attention, and the 
ramifications of such innovation would probably have brought it increased anti- 
trust pressures. 
However, Warren suggests quite strongly that technological and organiza- 
tional innovation was never at the heart of US Steel's evolution. The term he 
uses again and again to describe US Steel's efforts is "entrepreneurial failure," 
meaning that the corporation failed to respond quickly, much less take the lead, 
in addressing numerous issues in the industry. 
This entrepreneurial failure occurred in a range of different areas. The 
company failed to address the issue of locational change: as steel markets shift- 
ed westward and then southward, the corporation remained overly focused on 
the Pittsburgh area. The company failed to address changes in product demand 
- as the economy shifted from a production-base to to a consumer-base, with 
the latter's demand for lighter steels, much of the corporation's capabilities 
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remained in heavier steels. And it especially missed key shifts in technology, 
such as the shift to oxygenated steel making and continuous casting production. 
Thus, US Steel lagged behind its competitors in many different areas - and 
these competitors were not only other steel companies in North America but, 
by the mid-1950s, included a growing number of overseas steel corporations 
that exported increasing amounts of steel into the US. And, interestingly, 
despite all the alligator tears cried by steel companies in the US over the years 
about the high wages the evil steelworkers' union forced them to pay, which 
supposedly made it so terribly difficult to compete with overseas-based com- 
panies, Warren gives this issue short shrift, noting that high productivity was 
more important than low wages. 
The biggest failure by US Steel was in its response to "mini-mills" that 
emerged in North America in the late 1960s-early 1970s. Instead of having to 
produce their own iron to make steel, the mini-mills rely on scrap iron as the 
base for production. Their more recent development allowed them to better 
locate their mills, giving them better access to their chosen markets. Especially 
in the early years, the "minis" had a definite cost advantage over the older, 
unionized companies. But more importantly, managements were more flexible 
and there was less development of a hierarchy between management and 
labour. These differences resulted in an incredible productivity gap: "In the late 
1980s, despite recent improvements, many integrated firms still required 5.5-6 
man-hours [sic] per ton of steel products; the figure for mini-mills was then 
commonly 1.5-2 man-hours [sic]" (286). This gave mini-mills almost a $100 
per ton cost advantage. 
From the late 1970s into the early 1990s, US Steel went through a tremen- 
dous down-sizing process - over 330,000 jobs were destroyed between 1973- 
1990 - as it tried to recreate itself, based on its most productive and modern 
plants. Inefficient andlor poorly located plants were closed, and excess raw 
material holdings were sold off. Through this process, US Steel has emerged as 
one of the most efficient steel-making corporations in the world today. 
Ironically, it was only when the corporation focused on a few things and did 
them well - repudiating much of its corporate history and rationale for exis- 
tence - did it excel as a steel corporation. It is this story that Warren tells so 
very well. But he does more. The sub-text of the book, at least as I read it, is 
the disembowelment of much of the capitalist propaganda about the knowl- 
edge, expertise, and rational decision-making of the corporate enterprise and 
particularly corporate management. And although Warren focuses on the out- 
comes of policy, rather than the processes by which it develops, the critique is 
devastating: despite having the resources to procure the very best expertise and 
knowledge to guide their company, US Steel officers again and again failed to 
meet the challenge of their competitors. For many years, its huge size hid its 
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limitations, but the restructuring of the last third of the 20th century illuminat- 
ed the traditional weaknesses of US Steel for all to see. 
That being said about the contributions of this book - and there are many 
-this still remains a deeply dissatisfying book to this reviewer. Warren not only 
fails to discuss the steelworkers, whose knowledge and labour-power contribute 
so strongly to the successes the corporation did achieve, but he all-but-ignores 
corporate policy toward labour. It's like managerial decisions concerning orga- 
nizational development are all that count in the making of steel. 
This management-focus fails, of course, to account for the efforts of work- 
ers to control the workplace, reduce management discretion, and end abuse by 
foremen, processes that led toward organizing and unionization. The 19 19 steel 
strike is covered in less than two pages. But as unsatisfactory as that is, the 
account of the 1937 decision by US Steel Chairman Myron Taylor to accept the 
presence of and sign a contract with the Steel Workers Organizing Committee 
is even worse. (SWOC was the organizational predecessor to the United 
Steelworkers of America.) The single most powerful corporation in the world at 
the time was forced to accept unionization by some of its workforce - SWOC 
only could bargain for its members as a result of the 1937 contracts, not all pro- 
duction workers - and this gets less than four pages of discussion! And some 
of that is simply wrong! 
To me, this is one of the key developments in the corporation's history. US 
Steel had been virulently anti-union from its earliest days, and had not signed 
a collective bargaining agreement after 1909. Management had worked hard to 
keep workers separated by ethnic, and then racial, discrimination in job place- 
ment. It undoubtedly opposed the early New Deal programs of US President 
Franklin Roosevelt, but established Employee Representation Plans in 1933, 
when after the National Industrial Recovery Act became law it was hoped that 
this would preclude unionization. It made massive investment in espionage and 
spying, and union advocates were dismissed when discovered. The Corporation 
opposed the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, and Roosevelt's re-election 
efforts in 1936. In short, the Corporation was not about to cede any manage- 
ment prerogative to labour without a struggle. 
And yet, Myron Taylor decided to accept SWOC without even a strike. 
Warren conjures up the threat of a "damaging strike" that supposedly was to 
take place on April, 1937 to explain part of the reason for the acceptance of the 
union, but provides no evidence of this possible strike: the historical evidence 
for such a strike remains well hidden, as the steelworker organizing drive was 
far less successfbl than SWOC's propaganda at the time claimed. Yes, orders for 
the corporation were improving, and a strike could have hurt this recovery from 
the Depression, but there is no evidence that SWOC was planning to strike, and 
there had to be serious discussion within top-level management over labour- 
related issues - but one gets no hint of this from Warren. 
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Other things are missing, too. There's no mention of the impact of the 
autoworkers' successful sit-downs in Flint, Michigan against General Motors in 
late 1936-early 1937 on Taylor's thinking. There is no awareness by Warren of 
the organizing going on in the mills that preceded founding of SWOC in June, 
1936, and how steelworkers had organized particularly in the Chicago area but 
around Pittsburgh and Youngstown as well. There was no mention of the cor- 
poration\ efforts to buy off steelworkers with a small raise in November, 1936, 
after it had refused such in the preceding September. Nor was there any men- 
tion of the reports going to John Stephens, head of Industrial Relations, from 
African-American newspaper entrepreneur Claude Barnett and his researchers 
in Gary, Indiana: Barnett's researchers were finding that African-American 
steelworkers in Gary were terribly aware of the racial discrimination in the 
mills, blamed corporate management for such discrimination, and were over- 
whelmingly unwilling to scab against a C10 strike on behalf of the corporation. 
In short, Warren ignores a key factor in the development of the corpora- 
tion: the unionization of its workforce. Management was forced to accept col- 
lective bargaining by some of its workforce, and managerial domination in the 
workplace began being attenuated. Major strikes in 1946 and especially 1959 
affected corporate productivity and management rule. The union - despite its 
many limitations - both improved things for production workers, and limited 
management discretion in closing plants or restructuring. But to Warren, this is 
of no consequence. 
And yet, failure on the issue of labour and labour relations is only an indi- 
cation of the limitation of the overall study: Warren fails to understand the 
social power of US Steel - this was no ordinary corporation, at least until the 
early 1970s: it was a power within the US social order and, accordingly, the 
world. It was the dominant corporation in the industry that was key to eco- 
nomic development in North America, Europe, Japan and the Soviet Union. It 
is this larger sense that is missing from Warren's details, and his presentation 
excludes any sense of the larger drama in which upper management was 
involved. 
In short, this is a book that I expect will be the standard on its subject for 
many years to come. Warren provides considerable data, strong arguments and 
critical evaluation of his subject. If one wants an economistic and technology- 
focused study, it will be hard to surpass this. But there is so much more to the 
corporate history that is missing - and it is this missing larger sense that keeps 
this study from being a classic. 
Kim Scipes 
University of Illinois at Chicago 
